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Independence and Accountability of Regulatory Agencies in Turkey 
One of the most salient issues regarding independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) is how to 
ensure their accountability without undermining their independence that is deemed essential for the 
fulfillment their mandates. This, so called “independence-accountability dilemma” (Priest 1998; 
Scott 2000), is a fundamental issue concerning distribution of power and legitimatization of the use 
of power. Thus, designing a regulatory framework that instigates “the right balance between 
independence and accountabililty” (Majone 2005a: 53) is critical for both democratic and good 
governance. In agreement with Priest (1998) and Hupkes, Quintyn, and Taylor (2005), we contend 
that independence and accountability are not contradictory, but rather fully consistent with one 
another. In other words, if the regulatory framework is properly designed, independence and 
accountability become complementary and mutually supportive, rather than mutually exclusive 
values. In such a framework, accountability arrangements make independence effective because 
they provide legitimacy and credibility to the independent agency. (Hupkes, Quintyn, and Taylor 
2005; Majone 2005 )  
As IRAs diffuse across not only economically developed countries, but also less developed 
ones (Levi-Faur 2003, Jordana and Levi-Faur 2005; Sosay and Zenginobuz 2005), studies focusing 
on the interaction between independence and accountability of IRAs in various political contexts 
gain increasing importance.
 Although there is an ever growing literature on the independence and 
accountability of IRAs in economically advanced countries and the European Union, independence 
and accountability of IRAs in less developed countries has not yet drawn sufficient scholarly 
attention. As an effort to address this gap, this paper focuses on and evaluates the formal (statutory) 
independence and accountability of eight IRAs that operate in economic sectors in Turkey.  These 
are, namely, the Competition Agency (CA), the Capital Markets Board (CMB), the Banking 
Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA), the Public Procurement Agency (PPA), the 
Telecommunications Agency (TA), the Energy Markets Regulatory Agency (EMRA), Sugar 
Agency (SA), and the Tobacco, Tobacco Products, and Alcoholic Beverages Markets Regulation   2
Agency (TTAMRA).
1 The objective of this paper is to analyze the relationship between formal  
independence and accountability of these IRAs.
 2 
Independence of IRAs 
Independence: The Fundamentals 
An initial question to be addressed regarding IRAs is why governments and legislatures choose to 
delagate decision-making powers to authorities that will by design be independent from them. After 
all, IRAs may follow policies that will be different than what the governments and legislatures 
would themselves choose to follow, and it is not evident why governments and legislatures would 
want to forego some of their powers in this manner. Gilardi (2005), in his review of the literature on 
the rationales for the establishment of IRAs
3, provides the following list as to why IRAs may prove 
to be preferable to ordinary bureaucratic structures: 
•  Expertise: IRAs by design have more flexible organizational structures that also provide 
better compensation for their employees, leading to more qualified personnel to work for 
them than those that work for traditional buraucracies; 
•  Flexibility: Their autonomous structures allow IRAs better adjust to changing conditions in 
the industries they regulate; 
•  Decision-making costs. IRAs are not going to be inhibited from making decisions regarding 
industries they regulate in cases where elected governments would tend to stall due to 
uncertainty about political gains and losses of policies; 
•  Credible commitments: IRAs, with their longer time horizons, ameliorate the credibility 
problem that arises due to the fact that commitment by a government to a regulatory policy 
in a particular industry (for example, one that promises fair return to long-term investments 
                                                 
1 See Sosay and Zenginobuz (2005) for an analysis of the proliferation of IRAs in Turkey. The ninth Turkish IRA, 
namely, the Radio and Television Supreme Council, is not included in our sample as it is functionally differentiated 
form the eight economic sector IRAs. 
2 The OECD inventory of regulatory authorities does include Turkey, as a member of the OECD. However, data on the 
Turkish financial regulators are missing from the inventory (OECD 2005)  
3 See Majone 1994a, 1999, 2001a; Horn 1995; Moe 1990; OECD 2002a: 95.   3
by private agents) cannot be guaranteed to last beyond the following election as the new 
government may have different preferences over outcomes in that industry; 
•  Stability: IRAs also imply a more stable policy environment even in the absence of 
credibility problems (due to, for example, high likelihood that the same government remains 
in power over several elections) as the rules and regulations will less likely be subject to 
sudden and unexpected changes; 
•  Economic efficiency: The better regulatory environment resulting from (i)-(v) above will 
lead to better economic performance in markets subject to regulation; 
•  Public participation and transparency: IRAs embody more open and transparent decision-
making processes than those of ordinary bureaucratic structures, and therefore are more 
open democratic control by consumers and ordinary citizens; 
•  Blame shifting: IRAs shield politicians from blame when unpopular decisions are taken or 
when regulatory failures occur; 
•  Political uncertainty: IRAs provide the politicians with a vehicle to lock in policies that they 
favor beyond their term of office as the policies of IRAs are by their nature more difficult to 
interfere with. 
 
Some of the points in the list above involve normative prescriptions indicating why IRAs should be 
preferred in favor of other type of regulatory bodies, while others involve positive predictions 
indicating why we would expect politicians to choose delegating some of their authority to IRAs. 
Of the points raised in the list above, the two that have received a lot of emphasis in recent work on 
delegation are the credibility problem and the uncertainty problem (Bendor, Glazer, and Hammond 
2001; Huber and Shipan 2004; Miller 2005). 
The Credibility Problem and the Independence of IRAs 
The credibility and the time inconsistency problem that governments face in implementing their 
policies was first pointed at systematically by Kydland and Prescott (1977), where the issue was 
how to conduct monetary policy. Should the governments exercise discretion and adopt their   4
monetary policies to current conditions, or conduct policy on the basis of fixed rules (“rules versus 
discretion”)? They pointed out that there was a potential conflict between policy-makers discretion 
and policy optimality, and they argued that the ensuing problem could be ameliorated if the policy 
makers could credibly commit themselves to a fixed and pre-announced course of action. Policy-
makers discretion can lead to time inconsistent policies, because (i) policy-makers will change their 
policies over time to adapt them to new information (which was not available at the time initial 
decision was made); (ii) their preferences may change (a new government, new public opinion etc.). 
Time inconsistency problem arises in politics as a consequence of the lack of well-defined 
political property rights: the right to exercise public authority does not belong to anyone; public 
authority is only temporarily attached to those who win elections (Moe (1990)). There is an inherent 
uncertainty in the democratic political process: “whatever today’s authorities create stands to be 
subverted or perhaps completely destroyed – quite legally and without compensation whatever – by 
tomorrow’s authorities” (Moe 1990: 227).  
When the success of policy relies ultimately on the response of rational individuals, even a 
policy that has been adopted with best of intentions for the benefit of the collective good may be 
rendered ineffective by rational actors that anticipate the future moves of policy-makers who would 
want to change these policies when new contingencies arise. Policies that are rendered time-
inconsistent due to expectations of rational agents suffer from a lack of credibility. Time 
inconsistent policies are not credible because rational actors know that they are subject to revision. 
It is very difficult for elected politicians to be credible, because they have a very short time horizon, 
namely the next election. Also, a legislature cannot bind the following legislatures, nor a majority a 
subsequent majority. Hence the coherence of policies over time is jeopardized. 
One possible solution to this credibility proble for governments is the delegation of 
competencies to independent agencies. Policy-makers thus give up their discretion and commit 
themselves to more or less fixed rules (Shepsle 1991; Dixit 1996).
4 Independent agencies have 
                                                 
4 See also Elster (1979) on the strategy of commitment to manipulate the feasible set of alternatives through restricting 
the set of possible actions and changing the reward structure.   5
different incentives and do not suffer from the short time horizon imposed by the democratic 
process. Hence their capacity to credibly commit themselves is much greater than that of 
democratically accountable and elected bodies. 
The policy-makers need to be credible especially when they cannot rely on coercion to 
implement their policies (Majone 1997a). For example, in the case of foreign direct investments, if 
a government wants to convince foreign investors to invest in its domestic firms, it cannot force 
them, but it has to convince them that its policies will favor their investments. Hence it must 
establish credibility. 
In addition to time-inconsistency and the related credibility problem, there are, however, 
other political transaction costs that affect political exchange. These costs involve informational 
problems such as adverse selection (hidden information) and moral hazard (hidden action), which in 
turn lead to what are called the “agency losses”. Agency losses arise whenever one actor, the 
principal, delegates some power or competencies to another actor, which becomes its agent (Moe 
1984; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1998). Adverse selection occurs when the principal cannot 
be sure that he is selecting the agent that has the most apporpriate skills or prefeences; moral hazard 
occurs when the agent’s actions cannot be prefectly monitored by the principal. 
The establishment of independent agencies will give rise to agency problems. The agency 
will tend to pursue its own interests rather than that of the government unless some incentive 
mechanisms are established. While agencies may solve the credibility problem with their 
independence from political influence, agency losses that will inevitably arise due to information 
problems may very well outweigh the credibility gains arising from their independence. 
Political Uncertainty And Delegation Of Authority To IRAs 
In additon to the credibility problem, governments may also be willing to give up authority to IRAs 
due to what is called “political uncertainty” (Moe 1990). Political uncertainty refers to the 
possibility that future decisionmakers will be different from the current ones and will in most 
likelihood want to change the policies adopted by the latter. One way of reducing the possibility of   6
policy reversal that will be undesirable from the viewpoint of the current decisionmakers is to make 
it more difficult to temper with policy by creating an independent agency with a mandate that is 
biased towards keeping the favored policy. 
By insulating their favored agencies and programs from the future exercise of public 
authority governments will, of course, “not only be reducing their enemies’ opportunities for future 
control; they will be reducing their own opportunities as well.” (Moe 1990: 227-229). That is, 
creating an independent agency to protect favored policies will affect not only the future 
decisionmakers but all decsionmakers, including the one that creates the independent agency. In 
other words, creating the independent agency will also tie the hands of the decsionmaker that 
creates it. 
It should be noted that the argument regarding the credibility problem and political 
uncertainty argument are partially related to each other as the presence of political uncertainty 
exacerbates the credibility problem. However, as noted by Gilardi (2005), the incentive for creating 
an independent agency is very different in each case. 
What makes a regulator independent? 
In an attempt to operationalize the notion of regulatory independence, Greve (2002: 19-20) 
considers the following five questions:  
(i)  Can any minister interfere and overrule the decisions made by the agency in specific 
cases? 
(ii)  Can any minister make strategic decisions regarding the regulation? 
(iii)  Does the same personnel policy and management rules apply as in the central 
administration in general? 
(iv)  Can the minister formulate policy independently of the regulatory agency? 
(v)  Is the regulatory agency financed by government and parliament through the 
ordinary state budget? 
   7
The degree of regulatory independence is then related to how many of these questions are answered 
in the negative. 
In contrast to Greve’s definition, which only concerns the relationship between the 
independent regulator and government, Smith’s (1997: 1) definition also pays attention to the 
relationship between the regulatory agency and the regulated industry. He defines independence for 
regulators as consisting of the following three elements: 
(i)  an arm’s-length relationship with regulated firms, consumers and other interests, 
(ii)  an arm’s-length relationship with political authorities, 
(iii)  organisational autonomy, such as earmarked funding and exception from restrictive 
civil service salary rules, that is necessary to establish the requisite expertise and to 
maintain those arm’s-length relationships.  
Operationalization of independence 
Towards a more detailed operationalization of regulatory independence, Gilardi (2002) develops 
a measure that concentrates on formal (statutory) independence. He draws on Kreher’s (1997) 
operationalization, which uses many of the insights developed for measuring central bank 
independence (Cukierman et al, 1992; Cukierman and Webb, 1995; Kreher, 1997).  
Kreher (1997) introduces the distinction between statutory independence and actual 
independence, as it would not be possible to reduce actual independence to legal status of the 
agencies. Elaborating on Kreher’ (1995) distinction, Gilardi (2002) distinguishes between formal 
independence and actual independence, and introduces an operationalization of formal, or statutory 
independence.
5  He divides formal (statutory) independence into four dimesions: 
i.  Status of the director of the agency, 
ii.  Status of the board of directors, 
                                                 
5 As also argued by Gilardi (2005), informal (actual or or de facto) independence is obviously also important, but formal 
independence is the fundamental issue when one studies the creation of IRAs by decision-makers  but the former is the 
most relevant factor when the decision to delegate is investigated. Formal independence is a variable that decision-
makers are able to determine shape, and it has significant impact on how the actual independence of an agency will turn 
out to be. 
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iii.  Relationship with the government and legislative; and 
iv.  Financial and organizational autonomy. 
The indicators associated to these variables are presented in Table 1 (See Appendices). In each case 
0 indicates lowest level of independence and 1 indicates highest level of independence. Indicators 
are first aggregated at the variable level, with equal weights. Then, the variable-level indices are 
aggregated, again with equal weights, to arrive at the overall independence index. 
Independence of IRAs in Turkey
6 
Table 2 (See Appendices) displays detailed information on independent regulatory agencies in 
Turkey. Using Gilardi’s (2002) index described above, we assess the formal independence of 
Turkish regulatory agencies. In Table 3 (See Appendices) we present detailed information on two 
Turkish agencies to demonstrate the nature of the operationalization involved. Table 4 provides 
variable-level and the overal independence indices for all of the Turkish agencies. The last two 
columns on electricity regulators in Italy and the U.K. are from Gilardi (2002) and are included for 
the purpose of comparison. 
Table 4 (See Appendices) reveals a general tendency regarding the formal independence of 
Turkish agencies. Except for the SA and the TTAMRA, the formal independence indices for 
Turkish agencies are around in the range 0.71-0.74. Comparing the four variable-level indices 
among themselves, we observe that the formal independence indices that involve the appointment 
stage, i.e. those involving the agency head status variable and the board member status variable, are 
in general lower than the formal independence indices for the post appointment stage. 
Accountability of IRAs 
Accountability: The Fundamentals 
There is a growing academic and/or policy-oriented literature on the accountability of IRAs. On the 
subject, the field is rather rich with definitions, conceptual and theoretical frameworks that largely 
overlap and complement, rather than contradict, one another.  
                                                 
6 This section draws on Zenginobuz (2002b).   9
Based on two definitions of accountability formulated by Caiden (1998: 25) and Jacobzone 
(2005: 98), we, in this paper, take accountability to be an obligation to report, to explain, to give 
reasons, to respond,  to answer for, to render a reckoning, to submit to an outside or external 
judgment, and  bear the consequences of the manner in which the regulator has discharged duties, 
fulfilled functions and utilized resources as well as of its regulatory performance.  While this 
definition offers a general understanding of what accountability involves, it does not provide clear 
answers to some critical questions that must be addressed to assess accountabililty. These questions 
are, namely: 
•  who is accountable? 
•  accountable to whom? 
•  accountable for what? 
•  accountable by what means or mechanisms? 
Answering these questions is necessary to obtain a complete picture of accountability within a 
specific regulatory regime. Thus, this section presents a literature-based discussion and analysis 
addressing these questions as a means to develop a framework that can be used to empirically study 
and evaluate the accountability of IRAs. 
•  Who is accountable?  
The identification of the agent or who is to be held accountable is an important, yet often not 
sufficiently emphasized issue. The answer is generally presumed, rather than questioned. The 
predominant assumption is that IRAs as institutions or “corporate bodies organized to perform 
particular functions” (Priest 1998) are to be held accountable for rationality, legality, fairness, 
performance, and other criteria that will be specified below. This is not an ungrounded assumption 
since powers are generally delegated to IRAs as institutions, rather than to individuals that occupy 
positions within these institutions, and regulatory decisions and activities involve collective and 
collaborative work     10
On the other hand, it should also be acknowledged that institutions are managed and operated by 
individuals. As Priest underlines, “human behavior is what drives institutions.” (1998: 5) Individual 
‘regulocrats’, like bureaucrats who are agents in the traditional delegation chain, are subject to the 
provisions of administrative law for their way of conduct (administrative accountability). This is a 
necessary, but possibly not sufficient contraint to ensure high quality regulation by IRAs. 
Individuals occupying positions in IRAs, such as their chairs and board members, may act perfectly 
in accordance with the requisites of administrative law; yet, their actions may not contribute to or 
may counter the efforts to generate the regulatory outcomes IRAs are mandated to produce. Adding 
in a personalized version of accountabililty for regulatory functions and activities performed 
independently by IRAs as well as for their performance can help deal with this potential problem.  
In sum, the question of ‘who is accountable’ should be addressed at two levels: institutions and 
individuals. The laws institutionalizing independent regulatory agencies may hold the agencies 
and/or individuals who manage and operate them accountable. Hence, differentiating between 
institutional and personal accountability can provide a more nuanced comparison across regulatory 
regimes. 
•  Accountable to whom? 
In recent years, the networks of accountability in regulatory regimes have extended so much as 
to justify Scott’s (2000) model of ‘redundancy’ applicable to some. Within this context, formulation 
of accountability as a vertical and linear relationship between principals and agents can offer only a 
partial answer to the question ‘accountable to whom’.  ‘The 360° view of accountability’ developed 
by the British House of Lords (2003) clearly demonstrates the multitude of actors with which IRAs 
are in a relationship of accountability. (Figure 1) 
   11
 
 
Figure 1: The 360° view of accountability. The shaded boxes comprise the bodies that exercise power 
directly in relation to the regulators. Citizens, consumer bodies and regulated bodies lack the power to 
summon regulators to justify their actions. (Source: House of Lords 2003).  
 
In analyzing to whom IRAs are accountable, Scott (2000) presents a view of accountability 
in three dimensions: upwards, horizontal, and downwards. In ‘upwards’ accountability, that 
corresponds to the simple vertical relationship between principals and agents and to the shaded 
boxes in Figure 1, accountability is rendered to a higher authority. ‘Horizontal’ and ‘downwards’ 
accountability involve accountability to broadly parallel (e.g. independent monitoring or appeal 
bodies, audit offices, ombudsmen) and to lower level institutions and groups (e.g. consumers, 
interest groups), respectively.  
First and foremost, IRAs are designed to be accountable to the three branches of the 
government, namely, the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary (‘upwards’ accountability). 
This is essential to ensure that regulatory activities correspond with the democratic will that is 
represented by these institutions and that IRAs do not emerge as a ‘fourth branch’ operating 
independently from the system of checks and balances in a representative democracy. 
As IRAs have evolved, increased in number, and diffused across sectors, the inadequacy of 
traditional hierarchical (‘upwards’) mechanisms of accountability between principals and agents 
with delegated powers, and thus, the necessity of establishing a network of complementary and 
overlapping checking mechanisms (Majone 1994b) that will be studied in further detail below have 
become increasingly evident. Consequently, accountability in regulatory regimes have been 
extended to make IRAs also accountable to specially established independent monitoring or appeal   12
bodies, audit offices, and ombudsmen (‘horizontal’ accountability).  Even though these institutions 
often do not have the formal authority to control and sanction regulators, they perform crucial 
functions, such as scrutiny and formal review. Therefore, such bodies should also be included in the 
360° view of accountability.  
Thirdly, the controversy around the democratic accountability and legitimacy of independent 
non-majoritarian institutions, such the IRAs
7, have contributed to bringing in the stakeholders, 
namely, the consumers and regulated industries, and the general public into the framework of 
accountability. In addition to being indirectly accountable to the stakeholders and the general public 
constitutiong the electorate, via their elected representatives in the parliament, regulators have also 
been made directly accountable to them (‘downwards’ accountability).  Mechanisms of 
accountability that provide information and representation to the stakeholders and citizens en masse 
and voice and choice to individuals for their discretionary use (Lodge 2004) have been incorporated 
into regulatory regimes.
8 
•  Accountable for what? 
The question of accountability for what has been a much debated issue. Firstly, since IRAs are 
created primarily to promote effective regulation, much emphasis has been put on accountability for 
regulatory outcomes or performance. This can be explained by the emergence of what Behn (2001) 
calls the “new public management paradigm”, which aims “at fostering a performance-oriented 
culture that is characterized by [among other things] a closer focus on results.” (The Public 
Management Service of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development , Cited in 
Behn) Regardless of whether they subscribe to this paradigm or not, both the practitoners and 
scholars of regulation agree on the quality of regulatory outcomes or performance as a criterion for 
which IRAs must be accountable for. There is also consensus that regulatory outcomes should be 
evaluated on the basis of whether they meet the objectives that they have been assigned. In order to 
be able to make an accurate assesment of the quality of regulatory outcomes, these objectives must 
                                                 
7 See Majone (1999 ), Sosay (2006).  
8 See Mulgan (2000) for a related discussion.   13
be clearly identified. While this may be relatively easy to do theoretically on paper, operationalizing 
and measuring them so that they can be used as yardsticks to evaluate regulatory performance pose 
a challenge. 
Based on a survey of relevant literature, Gilardi (2005) provides a comprehensive list of 
rationales for the establishment of IRAs. They are, namely, increasing expertise, flexibility, 
credibility, stability, efficacy and efficiency, public participation and transparency; reducing 
decision-making costs and political uncertainty; and blame shifting. Differentiating the reduction of 
decision-making costs and political uncertainty as well as blame shifting as positive arguments that 
aim to explain, rather than to provide prescriptions for action, and underlining the methodological 
difficulty of determining if IRAs have led to increased expertise, flexibility, credibility, and stability 
in the regulatory process, he argues that the best way to evaluate regulators with respect to their 
output is to focus on efficacy and efficiency, that is, their impact on market performance. 
The quality of regulatory outcomes IRAs is only one aspect of regulatory quality. As such, 
output-oriented accountability cannot by itself guarantee democratically legitimate and good 
governance. Many scholars of IRAs emphasize procedural legitimacy as a standard that 
complements output legitimacy and hence, helps resolve the controversy around the legitimacy of 
IRAs in democracies (Majone 1999; Scharpf 1999). From this perspective, IRAs are to be held 
accountable for process. In other words, the regulators are made accountable for their activities and 
actions in the decision making process. This involves determining whether the regulators have 
followed the rules of conduct and decision making or met the process requirements that are 
established by law or statute. Legality and fairness are the primary values which the regulators are 
accountable for. Accountability for the budget and financial accounts that is sometimes separately 
listed may also be regarded as a sub-category under accountability for process. 
•  Accountable by what means or mechanisms? 
The mechanisms of accountability for IRAs are ideally designed to ensure that nobody controls 
the independent agencies, yet they are ‘under control’ (Moe 1987). This is the prescribed recipe for   14
minimizing the trade-off between independence and accountability.  In a regulatory regime based 
on this general principle, the first requirement is that delegated powers, objectives, roles, 
responsibilities, and decision-making processes of IRAs must be clearly specified in laws. In other 
words, a legal framework that explicitly specifies who is accountable to whom and for what as well 
as how decisions and actions are to be taken is the first condition that must be met in designing 
accountable as well as independent IRAs and ensuring accountability for both process and output. 
Another general condition that must be incorporated into the design of mechanisms of 
accountabilility, again for both process and outcome, in regulatory regimes is transparency. The 
regulators cannot be fully held accountable when their regulatory activities that are not made 
transparent. That is to say, accountability presumes transparency.  In practical terms, this involves 
creating regulatory regimes with “prescribed standards of making regulatory activities accessable 
and assessable” (Lodge 2004: 127) to all the actors whom IRAs are accountable to, such as the 
parliament, the executive, the judiciary, financial auditors, monitoring agencies, the stakeholders, 
and the general public. Otherwise, lack of information and/or potential information asymmetries can 
undermine accountability. 
When the intent is limited to making regulatory activities ‘accessable’, transparency can be 
attained by providing and publicizing information about regulatory activities. Obliging IRAs to 
publish regular formal reports and financial statements, to write explanations of deliberations, 
proceedings and  specific decisions, to respond to requests for information is the primary means of 
doing this. These mechanisms of accountability created to enhance transparency are crucial for both 
ex ante and ex post accountability as the IRAs are obligated to report before and after action is 
taken. 
To make regulatory activities ‘assessable’ as well as ‘accessable’, the ‘addressees’ of these 
aforementioned documents should be also taken into account. When they are are addressed to 
specialized bodies, they may and in most cases are expected include for example, economic 
information, such as data, models, and forecasts, that can be grasped and evaluated only by experts.   15
On the other hand, when the objective is revelation and dissemination of information to the 
‘laypeople’ whom IRAs are accountable to, such as consumers and the general public, written and 
oral statements (e.g. press statements) should be formulated in a language understandable to those 
who are not experts. 
Merely obliging the IRAs to be accountable is not sufficient to alleviate the concerns about their 
democratic accountability and legitimacy. Hence, other mechanisms to enhance democratic 
accountability without too much endangering the independence of regulatory agencies are 
introduced. One such mechanism is the institutionalization of appointment, reappointment, and 
dismissal procedures by which the senior officials of IRAs are appointed, reappointed, and 
dismissed by the government or the head of state upon recommendation by the finance minister or 
the government. As Hupkes, Quintyn, and Taylor assert “[g]overnmental appointment serves to 
strengthen their position, in particular, in relation to the regulated industry. Reappointment and 
dismisal procedures may be looked at as mechanisms of personal accountability, and reappointment 
of officials, in principle, could function as a mechanism of ex post accountability by which an 
official could be dismissed on grounds of bad performance.” (2005: 1591) 
Regulatory policies and decisions involve value judgments that affect the welfare of the 
stakeholders as well as the general public and may inevitably have redistibutive effects. While 
making IRAs accountable for their regulatory outputs may provide channels through which these 
actors can contest them after a decision is made or an action is taken, the requirements of 
democratic legitimacy may be interpreted to also include ex ante accountability. Whether, how, and 
how much the stakeholders and the public (directly or through their elected representatives) are not 
only provided information, but also represented in the process, allowed to participate, and consulted 
before a decision is made or an action is taken should also be taken as measures in evaluating the 
accountability of IRAs. Hence, various means of representation, participation, and consultation are 
incorporated into regulatory regimes.   16
Representation of the parliament and/or the stakeholders in advisory and/or supervisory 
boards/committees of the IRAs provides a channel through which the representatives of the general 
electorate and those who are directly affected by regulatory actions and decisions can participate in 
the regulatory process. Consultation with the parliamentarians and the stakeholders is expected take 
place mainly in the boards/committees where they are represented. Appearances before the 
parliament and ad hoc inquiries also provide a means of consultation and an opportunity for the 
parliament to probe and criticize regulatory activities. Whether consultation is obligatory or 
optional, whether advisory and/or supervisory boards/committees are standing or ad hoc, and 
whether the apperances before the parliament are regular or ad hoc can be used as indicators of 
accountability. 
While the regulators are generally expected to include an overall economic assessment in 
their annual reports prepared for those whom they are accountable to, some additional mechanisms 
are often established to secure the budgetary and financial accountability of IRAs. The review of the 
annual accounts and balance sheets  by a national audit office, independent auditors, such as 
private consulting firms and academic experts, and/or internal inspectors is often required to 
ensure good governance. The more independent and objective the audits, investigations, and other 
reviews are, the more effective the mechanisms of financial accountability are considered to be. 
With the exception of reappointment, and dismissal procedures, the mechanisms of 
accountability introduced thus far do not involve punishment. While these mechanisms are 
necessary, they are not sufficient to assure accountability. The obligations to report, to explain, to 
consult for advisory opinions, and to be audited do not go much beyond providing transparency and 
access in the absence of formal and authoritative appeal and sanctioning mechanisms. Such 
mechanisms are provided primarily within the framework of judicial accountability and in some 
cases, through special appellate bodies, governmental or ministerial bodies. 
The regulators are legally obligated to act within their powers and observe due-process 
requirements.  On one hand, as agents in the administrative structure, individual ‘regulocrats’ are   17
not immune from the provisions of administrative law. Thus, they can penalized for the abuse of 
power and administrative misconduct by courts. On the other hand, the fact that they occupy 
positions within IRAs that are created by special laws or statutes and that enjoy delegated powers 
incomparable to those exercised by traditional bureaucracies necessitates additional measures. First 
and foremost, whether they are acting within their powers and in accordance with the procedural 
rules specified in the founding documents of the IRA concerned are subject to the supervision and 
review of courts, special appellate bodies, or quasi-judicial governmental/ministerial bodies. The 
failure to comply with the procedural provisions of the IRA-specific legal documents which they 
are bound by is a ground for appeal or challenge and for the overturn of a regulatory decision. This 
is a mechanism that is designed to enhance accountability for process. 
A similar mechanism may allow appeals for errors of fact as well as on the merits of 
regulatory decisions (‘outputs’) including their legality and fairness. In this mechanism, those 
affected by regulatory decisions are granted the right of redress in the court or other bodies of 
appeal that can overturn decisions when they are found not to meet the requirements of legality 
and/or fairness.  
On the other hand, appeals and sanctioning based on the market-performance of IRAs are 
constrained by the discretion conferred on regulatory agencies as independent institutions with 
broad delegated powers. In democracies, the principals have the authority to revise and repeal the 
laws and statutes of IRAs as well to dismiss or not to reappoint the regulators. In some systems, the 
principals may also have the authority to cut the agencies’ budgets and other resources. However, 
the tension between independence and accountability constrains the principals’ ability and 
inclination to hold the regulators liable for and sanction institutional (or personal) failures in the 
substantive quality of regulatory decisions in relation to the market-related objectives the IRAs are 
mandated to achieve. The methodological and practical difficulties involved in evaluating the 
market-performance of IRAs that are often established to carry out multiple functions and 
accomplish multiple objectives and that “may compete with other regulatory authorities” (Hupkes,   18
Quintyn, and Taylor 2005: 1581) in achieving those objectives also create complications and make 
it difficult for the principals to measure IRAs’ performance againts their mandates and punish them 
for instituional (or personal) failures.  
Furthermore, the aforementioned sanctioning mechanisms, even when/if they are activated, 
may not be or viewed as measures that directly and solely penalize such failures. In other words, 
such sanctions rarely “provide an undiluted message to the agency and its members” (Priest 1998: 
19). For instance, legal amendments, reappointments, and dismissals may be due more to the 
principals’ political considerations than to the IRA’s market performance; changes in the agency’s 
budget and other resources may result from the need to introduce further fiscal discipline by 
reducing public expenditures. 
Regulatory regimes may be so designed that courts, special appellate bodies, or quasi-
judicial governmental/ministerial bodies have the power to overturn regulatory decisions based on 
their failure to serve market-related regulatory objectives. Yet, in addition to the methodological 
and practical complexities specified above, the fact that the judges often do not have the expert 
knowledge to accurately assess and reach to conclusions regarding the market performance of IRAs 
generally limits judicial oversight to the review of the regulatory processes and outputs for legality 
and fairness, rather than for market-performance. Furthermore, rules on immunity and limited 
liability of regulators (except that which is provided by administrative law) are correlates of 
independence and are justified by the need for effective regulation. The likelihood of direct legal 
actions against them can dissuade the regulators from acting promptly and decisively and hence, 
adversely affect the quality of regulatory outputs. (Hupkes, Quintyn, and Taylor 2005) 
The way mechanisms of accountability are or should be designed may vary depending on which 
doctrine of public management is adopted. Based on work by Hood (1986, 1997, 1998), Lodge 
(2004) sets up an accountability framework across three doctrines of public management, namely, 
fudiciary trusteeship doctrine, consumer sovereignty doctrine, and citizen empowerment doctrine. 
As doctrines that see different actors as loci of authority, they advocate different mechanisms of 
accountability. This is summarized in Table 5 (See Appendices). As will be evident in our analysis 
below, fudiciary trusteeship doctrine appers to be the dominant one shaping regulatory regimes in 
Turkey. 
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•  Operationalization of accountability 
There is a growing literature involving efforts to operationalize and measure the accountability 
of IRAs. Using published and internet sources, the OECD Secretariat prepared an inventory of 
regulatory authorities in 2003-2004. As a comprehensive tool for documenting regulatory regimes 
in member countries, the OECD inventory also includes variables and questions addressing 
accountability (OECD 2005). Gilardi, in a paper attached to the OECD’s 2005 report, presents a list 
of indicators and questions that can be used to empirically assess and compare accountability across 
regulatory regimes. Benefiting from pre-existing work and bringing in a few new indicators, this 
paper relies on the following indicators to evaluate the accountability of IRAs in Turkey. 
IRAs are institutionalized by laws or statutes that set the legal parameters of regulatory 
activities. Since it is the first requisite for independent and accountable regulatory agencies, the first 
indicator is the following: 
1)  Does the law (or statute) institutionalizing the IRA clearly specify the accountees, the 
accountability holders, decision making procedures, and mechanisms of accountability, as 
well as unambigously define and in case of multiple objectives, prioritize the objectives of 
the IRA? 
   The identification of those who is/are accountable is significant in differentiating who is/are 
to be held responsible for regulatory activities. If the IRA as a corporate body, rather than an 
individual or a group of individuals, is specified as the accountee, it is more difficult to distinguish 
who is responsible and thus, must be held accountable for legality, fairness,  effectiveness, and so 
forth. This is a condition that weakens accoountability in regulatory regimes. 
2)  Is an individual (e.g. the chair of the IRA) or a board/commission rather than the IRA as an 
institution specified as being accountable? 
3)  Is it an individual or a board/commission who assumes the legal personality of the IRA and 
hence, is held accountable?   20
4)  Is the administrative personnel of the IRA accountable for personal conduct under 
administrative law? 
The answers to the general questions of ‘accountable to whom?’ ‘accountable for what?’ and 
‘accountable by what means or mechanisms?’ can be captured by a series of indicators. First, even 
though they are independent bodies, IRAs (or individuals occupying positions in them) are 
accountable to their principals that represent the democratic will. Hence, questions concerning 
IRAs’ formal obligations vis-à-vis the parliament and the executive must be included as indicators 
of democratic accountability.
9 
5)  What are the formal obligations (in law or statute) of the IRA vis-à-vis the executive 
government? 
•  No formal obligations 
•  Obligation to submit regular reports , for information only 
•  Obligation to submit regular reports and to get approval 
•  Obligation to explain decisions, deliberations, and proceedings 
•  Fully accountable to the government 
6)  What are the formal obligations (in law or statute) of the IRA vis-à-vis the Parliament? 
•  No formal obligations 
•  Obligation to submit regular reports, for information only 
•  Obligation to submit regular reports and to get approval 
•  Obligation to explain decisions, deliberations, and proceedings 
•  Fully accountable to Parliament 
7)  If there is a reporting requirement to the government and/or to the parliament, should reports 
cover financial accounts? 
                                                 
9 This set of questions  includes those formulated for the OECD inventory with some additions and /or modifications.   21
8)  If there is a reporting requirement to the government and/or to the parliament, should reports 
cover an evaluation of regulatory performance, including an assessment of whether and to 
which extent the objectives stipulated in law or statute have been achieved? 
Some aspects of transparency are covered by these questions. However, they may not be 
sufficient to address higher standards of transparency (also involving disclosure of full information 
to the stakeholders and the general public) incorporated into some, if not all, regulatory regimes. 
These standards are addressed by Gilardi (2005). His indicators are reformulated to capture 
mechanisms of formal accountability other than the formal obligations of the IRA vis-à-vis the 
government and the Parliament.  
9)  Is the IRA obliged to make the basic data and the formal economic models it uses for 
regulatory policy publicly available? 
10) Is the IRA obliged to publish and publicize its own economic forecasts? 
11) Is the IRA obliged to provide an explicit rule or strategy that describes its policy? 
12) Is the IRA obliged to disclose how each decision has been reached? 
13) Is the IRA obligated to use procedures for making regulation known and accessible to 
affected parties? 
14) Is the IRA subject to plain language drafting requirements? 
15) Is the IRA obliged to explain its decisions in a specific period of time? 
As underlined above, representation, participation, and consultation in decision making are also 
regarded essential for the democratic accountability and legitimacy of IRAs. The following 
indicators can be used to evaluate IRAs in this respect. 
16) Which groups are represented in these advisory boards/committees and in which proportion? 
17) Is the IRA obligated to consult advisory boards/committees before a decision or action is 
taken? 
18) Are these advisory boards/committees standing or ad hoc?   22
While the aforementioned reporting requirements of IRAs involve the disclosure of information 
on their financial accounts, this is generally not accepted as a sufficient means of supervision and 
control to ensure budgetary and financial accountability. External audits are considered to be one of 
the conditions for good governance are also incorporated into regulatory regimes.  
19) Is the IRA subject to a regular external audit of its financial accounts? 
20) If the IRA is subject to a regular audit of its financial accounts, is it audited by 
•  A national audit office 
•  Private consulting firms 
•  Independent academic experts 
•  Other? 
Finally, regarding the mechanisms of appeals and sanctions, first the following questions based 
on those included in the OECD inventory should be answered. 
21) Through whom can the decisions of the IRA be appealed or challenged? 
•  Courts 
•  A special appellate body 
•  Governmental or ministerial body 
•  Other? 
22) Which body, other than a court, can overturn the decisions of the IRA where the latter has 
exclusive competence? 
•  No body 
•  A special appellate body 
•  Governmental or ministerial body, with qualifications 
•  Governmental or ministerial body, unconditionally 
23) What are the accepted grounds for appeal or challenge? 
•  Errors of fact 
•  Errors of law (including failure to follow the due process)   23
•  Merits of the decision including its impact on market performance 
•  Other? 
Other means of punishment for the regulators who fail to achieve the IRA’s market-related 
objectives may be the non-renewal of their terms in office or dismissal. Hence, the last indicator: 
24) On what grounds can the chair and/or board members of the IRA be dismissed?  
The indicators listed in this section will guide our comparative analysis of accountability of IRAs in 
Turkey. 
Accountability of Independent Regulatory Agencies in Turkey 
The level of specification vary across laws insitutitonalizing these IRAs in Turkey. In other 
words, there is not a consistent and standard legislative formulation in which the institutional 
characteristics, decision making processes, mechanisms of accountability, and objectives of the 
aforementioned IRAs are clearly identified. As is evident from the analysis to be presented in this 
section and Table 6 (See Appendices), exclusion or insufficient specification of some of the 
fundamental requirements of accountability in the founding documents of IRAs is a deficiency that 
weakens their accountability. 
In Turkey, except the CMB, which itself is structured as a board, all economic sector IRAs 
rest on a distinction between the agency and its board as the decision making organ. The members 
of the boards are appointed by the Council of Ministers from among the candidates proposed by 
selected ministeries, state institutions, and/or non-governmental organizations while the chairs are 
chosen by the Council of Ministers or the members of the board. (see Table X-independence). 
Before they take office, the board members of all except of the TA, SA and TTAMRA, have to 
swear, before the Supreme Court, that they will carry out their duties with utmost care and honesty 
and will not act against the provisions of law during their terms in office. The laws institutionizing 
all eight IRAs recognize the chairs of the boards as the actors who represent their agencies and are 
responsible from and thus, accountable for the organization, supervision, implementation, 
evaluation and publicization of regulatory activities.   24
Based on the principle of integral unity of the administration provided by Article 123, 
paragraph 1 of the Turkish Constitution
10, IRAs are regarded as a part of the administration. As the 
independence of IRAs creates certain dilemmas regarding their status under administrative law
11, 
the administrative personnel of the IRAs in Turkey, are treated as public servants, except for their 
salaries and financial rights. As individuals hired by administrative service contracts, they are 
bound by the laws applied to public servants with the stated exceptions. 
Reporting requirements are the most salient of the IRAs’ formal obligations vis-à-vis the 
parliament and the government in Turkey. By article 7, paragraph 2 of the Law No. 4743 
(30.1.2002) on the restructuring of debts to the financial sector (Mali Sektöre Olan Borçların 
Yeniden Yapılandırılması ve Bazı Kanunlarda Değişiklik Yapılması Hakkında Kanun), IRAs are 
obligated to inform the Planning and Budget Committee of the Turkish Grand National Assembly 
of their regulatory activities once a year.
12 This condition is explicitly stated in the founding laws of 
only the CMB and the BRSA. Neither the Law No 4743, nor the laws instituting these two IRAs 
specify which information must be provided and in what form it should be presented (e.g. written 
reports, briefings, oral presentations) to this parliamentary Committee. The founding law of only the 
BRSA includes a provision regarding its obligation to submit an annual report of activities to the 
Committee, also consisting of an analysis of their social and economic effects, and financial 
accounts to the parliament. 
By article 7, paragraph 2 of the Law No. 4743, all IRAs in Turkey are obligated to submit 
annual reports of their activities to the Council of Ministers by the end of May. Again, the law does 
not stipulate the required contents of these reports. Aside from this umbrella provision, the reporting 
requirements included in the founding laws of these IRAs vary. For instance, the law 
institutionalizing the CA, oblige the agency to publish annual reports including its activities as well 
                                                 
10 The paragraph is as follows: “The administration forms a whole with regard to its structure and functions, and shall 
be regulated by law.“ (http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/english/constitution.htm) 
11 See Ulusoy (1999).  
12 Other paragraphs of this article, including that which provided for the auditing of IRAs’ annual financial accounts by 
a committee composed of an inspector from the Ministry of Finance, an inspector from the Prime Minister’s Office, and 
an auditor of the Supreme Supervision Board of the Prime Ministry, have been annulled for being against the 
Constitutional principles by a ruling of the Turkish Constitutional Court published in the Official Gazete on 14.03.2006, 
but this paragraph has been retained.   25
as the condition and developments in its area, but does not state the contents and the addressees of 
these reports. On the other hand, the CMB, BRSA, and EMRA are required to submit annual 
reports together with their financial accounts to their ‘related’ Ministries. The CMB also has to 
present analyses when asked by the Minister. The BRSA, when requested, provides information and 
analyses to the Undersecretariat of Treasury, the State Planning Agency, and the Central Bank. 
Mechanisms of accountability limited to annual reporting to the parliament, government, 
and selected state institutions remain insufficient to meet higher standards of transparency. Maybe 
most significantly, as public institutions, IRAs are bound by the provisions of the Right to Obtain 
Information Law (Law No 4982) which was published in the Official Gazette on 9.10.2003. The 
Law sets the principles and general procedures concerning the persons’ exercise of the right to 
obtain information in accordance with the principles of equality, impartiality, and opennes as 
requirements of democratic and transparent governance. The right excludes the disclosure of 
classified information and documents, information and documents the disclosure of which may 
damage the economic interests of the country or create unfair competition, civilian and military 
intelligence, commercial secrets, information and documents the revelation of which may hamper 
fair adjudication of cases under judicial review, or violate individuals’ privacy rights, as well as 
some internal organizational documents and correspondence of public bodies. Moreover, 
institutions subject to this law are not obligated to respond to requests for information or documents 
the presentation of which will require extra work, research, inquiry or analysis. Requests for 
recommendations and opinions are also outside the scope of this law. Despite all these limitations 
and safeguards, this law introduces a mechanism of transparency the significance of which should 
not be underestimated. 
Even though the importance of informing the public is at least mentioned in passing in the 
founding laws of almost all the IRAs in Turkey, we do not find consistency in the specification of 
requirements of transparency included in these laws. Those of the two least independent regulatory 
agencies, namely, the SA and the TTAMRA, as well as the TA are also the least specific in their   26
provisions. While the chair of the Sugar Board (of the Sugar Agency) is held responsible from 
informing the public and may, but is not obligated to communicate issues discussed at the board 
meetings as well as the decisions taken to the media, there are no provisions regarding transparency 
requirements in the founding laws of the TTAMRA and the TA. Neither are these three agencies 
legally obliged to publish their decisions or publicize regular reports of their activities. Similarly, 
the EMRA does not legally have to publish its decisions, but its founding law requires providing 
information on the details of grants from international institutions to the public and holds the chair 
of its board responsible from informing the public about its activities without stipulating how (like 
the SA).  
On the other hand, the laws institutionalizing the CMB, the BRSA, the CA, and the PPA 
have stricter requirements of transparency. First of all, their founding laws are highly specific in 
depicting their decision making procedures, contents of decisions, reasons for decisions, time 
periods during which decisions will be reached, announced, and appealed, as well as fees and 
penalties. Moreover, the CA is obliged to publish its final decisions, notifications, and bylaws. So is 
the CMB, which like the BRSA, issues weekly bulletins including decisions that interest the public. 
The PPA, on the other hand, is required to publish the Public Procurement Bulletin in both printed 
form and over the internet. However, for all these means of communication to the stakeholders and 
the public, there are no plain language requirements. 
In addition to revelation of information regarding the activities of IRAs to the stakeholders 
and the public, their representation and participation in decision making are also regarded as 
channels by which the accountability of IRAs can be enhanced. As presented in the section on the 
independence of IRAs in Turkey, the board members of IRAs in Turkey are chosen among 
candidates proposed by related ministries, public institutions and in some cases representative 
organizations of interested parties. Namely, on behalf of non-governmental actors, the following 
groups each have one appointed representative in the boards of the stated IRAs: the Union of 
Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) in the CMB, CA, PPA, and TA (together   27
with the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, the board member representing the consumers), the 
Association of Capital Market Intermediary Institutions of Turkey in the CMB, the 
telecommunications sector in the TA, the Interuniversity Council in the CA, the Confederation of 
Turkish Employer Unions in the PPA, the Union of Turkish Chambers of Agriculture in the 
TTAMRA, Turkish Sugar Factories Inc., Union of Turkish Sugar Beet Producer Cooperatives, and 
private sugar companies (2 representatıves) in the SA. The board of only the BRSA does not 
include any members proposed by non-governmental institutions.  
The IRAs in Turkey are not under any formal obligations to consult advisory 
boards/committees composed of the representatives of the stakeholders, consumers, the general 
public and/or independent experts the before decisions or actions are taken even though the laws or 
bylaws of some include vague references to the fact that they may and/or should seek the opinions 
of interested parties. For instance, the law establishing the TA includes a provision asserting that the 
agency may take measures to make the expression of opinions by interested parties possible, but not 
stipulating what those measures may or should be. If they deem necessary, the IRAs ‘related’ 
ministries may set up ad hoc advisory committees, but the only standing advisory bodies that are 
established are the advisory units within the organizational hiearachies of the agencies. 
Regarding financial accountability, we find different arrangements in the laws establishing 
the IRAs concerned.. The institution of financial oversight for the CA, TA, and the PPA is the the 
Turkish Court of Accounts (TCA), which under the Constitution and the Law on the Turkish Court 
of Accounts, is responsible for auditing on behalf of the Grand National Assembly (Parliament) the 
revenues, expenditures and property of government offices operated under the general and annexed 
budgets. With the 1996 amendment to its law, the TCA is also given the task of examining the 
extent to which the government offices under its jurisdiction use their resources with due regard to 
economic efficiency and effectiveness. 
A second group of IRAs, consisting of the EMRA, the SA, and the TTAMRA, are audited 
by the Supreme Supervision Board (SSB) of the Prime Ministry, which was originally created to   28
oversee the activities as well as the financial accounts of the state-owned enterprises in Turkey. 
Neither the founding laws of these three agencies, nor that of the TA specify that their “financial 
accounts” are overseen by the SSB and TCA, respectively. However, based on the fact that the 
decisions of IRAs are subject to adjudication by administrative courts, review by the SSB and the 
TCA is interpreted as being limited to finances.
13 
The ‘related’ ministers play a central role in the mechanisms of financial accountability of 
the two IRAs in the financial sector. The ‘related’ minister (a minister of state) has the financial 
accounts of the BRSA audited by a committee appointed by the minister himself/herself and 
composed of an inspector from the Court of Accounts, an inspector from Ministry of Finance, and 
an inspector from the Prime Minister’s Office. On the other hand, while the law establishing the 
CMB asserts that the minister has it audited, it does not specify by whom. In the cases of both the 
BRSA and the CMB, the minister is also responsible from taking measures based on the 
conclusions of the audit. Subsequently, s/he presents a report, including the conclusions of the audit 
as well as the measures taken, together with the IRA’s annual report of activities, to the Council of 
Ministers. The BRSA and the PPA also need to receive the clearance of their accounts from the 
Council of Ministers. In addition, the BRSA may, but does not have to, have its finances audited by 
an independent auditing firm. 
In Turkey, the IRAs are tied to the administrative structure through their related ministries. 
Hence, their decisions can be challenged, appealed, and overturn through administrative courts for 
errors of law, including the failure to follow the due process. While the judicial oversight of the 
BRSA, the CMB, TA
14 and the SA is carried out by (regional) administrative courts, the CA and the 
EMRA are overseen by the Council of State.
15 The law establishing the TTAMRA, on the other 
hand, does not specify a court or body of appeals. Except for the TTAMRA, some decisions of 
                                                 
13 Without further specification, the Turkish term used in this context (‘denetim’) may mean ‘control’, ‘check’, 
‘oversee’ or ‘audit’.   
14 For the francise contracts it signs, the TA asks for the opinion of the Council of State. 
15 The Council of State is the last instance for reviewing decisions and judgments given by administrative courts and 
which are not referred by law to other administrative courts. It shall also be the first and last instance for dealing with 
specific cases prescribed by law. (constitution) 
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which may be repealed with qualifications, by the government, no other body can overturn the 
decisions of the IRAs in Turkey. 
Last, but certainly not the least, although they do not constitute means of appeal, there are 
some means of punishment and reward at the disposal of the parliament and the government. 
Undoubtedly, the parliament always has the authority to introduce amendments in legislation by 
which powers are delegated to the IRAs. The Council of Ministers, on the other hand, has the 
authority to appoint and reappoint the board members of the IRAs in Turkey. Reappointment may 
be regarded as a reward for their performance in office. Yet, dismissal may hardly be used as a 
punishment for failures related to regulatory activities as the board members cannot be dismissed 
unless they lose the qualifications required for the job or violate laws.  
The “Independence and Accountability Dilemma”: The IRAs in Turkey 
Table 4 (See Appendices) reveals that the independence scores of economic sector IRAs in Turkey 
are close to each other across the board, except for the two IRAs in the agricultural sector, namely 
the SA and the TTAMRA. As was discussed in Sosay and Zenginobuz (2005), the creation of these 
two IRAs involved a number of peculiarites, including the sunset clause for SA, the regulatory body 
for the sugar industry. In fact, SA is now defunct. Both the SA and the TTAMRA are among 
Turkey’s less accountable IRAs. These observations point to the fact that less accountability does 
not imply more independence on the part of an IRA. Neither does less independence necessarily 
mean more accountability. 
IRAs are delegated powers and hence, granted independence by laws passed by the Turkish 
parliament. However, the laws establishing the IRAs in in Turkey, with the exception of the BRSA, 
do not explicitly specify any formal obligations vis-à-vis the parliament. It is only after the 
introduction of Law No 4743 that the IRAs have been required to annually ‘inform’ the 
parliament’s Planning and Budget Committee. Being almost as vague as some IRAs’ (e.g. CA) 
annual reporting requirements neither the contents not the addresses of which are stated in the 
founding laws, this provision of Law No 4743 do not ensure actual oversight by the parliament,   30
short of exercising its authority to amend legislation concerning IRAs. On the other hand, both the 
IRAs’ founding laws and the Law No 4743 introduce stricter reporting requirements vis-à-vis the 
executive through ‘related’ ministers and directly to the Council of Ministers. Moreover, the board 
members and chairs of the IRAs under consideration are appointed and reappointed by the Council 
of Ministers. As this pulls down the formal indepedence indices involving the appointment stage, it 
also enhances the ability of the executive to reward or punish regulators for regulatory performance. 
If is employed impartially and based on sound evaluation of the IRAs’ impact on market 
performance, this type of ex post executive oversight may be an effective mechanism to achieve 
high quality regulation. Yet, as mentioned before, reappointments may be due more to the political 
considerations of the government than to the IRAs’ regulatory performance. In any case, leaving 
accountability of IRAs primarily to the government, and to a lesser extent to the parliament, runs 
the danger of leading to overpoliticization.  
The problems of accountability generated by the imbalance between the oversight by the 
parliament and the executive can be mitigated by formally engaging non-governmental actors into 
the process of developing and implementing regulatory policy. However, the legal obligations of 
the economic sector IRAs in Turkey, especially when limited to the laws institutionalizing them 
(i.e. when the Right to Obtain Information Law is not taken into consideration), vis-à-vis the 
stakeholders and the general public are not strict enough to compensate for the existing deficiency 
of democratic accountability. This approach to regulatory design evidences that consumer 
sovereignty and citizen empowerment doctrines of public administration have not yet sufficiently 
penetrated into the thinking of institution builders in Turkey. 
Currently, the IRAs concerned publish and publicize more information, regular reports, and 
analyses than they are legally obliged to. As these documents are readily accessible especially via 
the internet, we may conclude that de facto  transparency of these agencies supersedes their de jure 
transparency requirements. Nevertheless, short of effective feedback mechanisms, such 
transparency is not sufficient to assure accountability. Even though it may be regarded as having the   31
risk of diminishing the independence of regulatory agencies,  formally obliging them to consult/get 
the approval of specialists, the stakeholders, and the general public may be a means to improve 
democratic accountability. This may take the form of including the representatives of these groups 
in the boards of IRAs as is the case for the stakeholders in the CA, CMB, TA, PPA, and SA in 
Turkey. While this may be a plus in terms of democratic accountability, due attention should be 
paid to prevent the creation of a bias in favor of the represented groups at the expense of the public 
interest and the “professionalization” of such participation by outside stakeholders. In other words, 
this mechanism of accountability should not divert the IRAs away from the public good (as 
specified by their objectives) for which they are granted independence at the first place. A similar 
line of argument can be made for the creation of standing advisory/supervisory committees which 
the IRAs may be obliged to consult/get the approval of.. 
As demonstrated in Table 4 (See Appendices), the index scores of ‘financial organization 
and autonomy’ of all, but two, economic sector IRAs in Turkey are relatively high. Despite 
enjoying such significant financial independence, the CMB, the BRSA, the EMRA, not to mention 
financially less autonomous agencies, namely, the SA and the TTAMRA, are financially 
accountable to ministerial/governmental bodies (or a committee appointed by the minister in the 
case of the BRSA). Only the CA, TA, and PPA are audited by the Court of Accounts exercising its 
authority to audit the revenues, expenditures and property of government offices operated under the 
general and annexed budgets on behalf of the Grand National Assembly (parliament). The variation 
in the mechanisms of financial accountability may be puzzling given that the six out of eight IRAs 
have very close scores in the independence index.  This reveals the contentious nature of the issue. 
As is stated by Karacan, in his monograph on Turkish IRAs, “in Ankara, battles are fought over 
who is to audit  the financial accounts of IRAs” (2002: 80) . He argues the reason for these conflicts 
which are reflected on the design of regulatory regimes in Turkey is the belief that “you control the 
agency you audit”. The persistence of such understanding is a cause for serious concern regarding 
the independence of IRAs.   32
The laws establishing the IRAs in Turkey do not include any formal mechanism whereby 
their market related performance are measured. Judicial oversight is limited due to the technical 
inadequacy of administrative courts, in particular due to insufficient number expert judges and other 
personnel to handle the ever increasing case load. The judicial reviews are generally limited to 
procedural checks on whether the actions taken confirm to the letter of the law. Even that has 
proven to be difficult as the laws of many IRAs are not specific enough to allow assesment of due 
process. 
There is certainly a need for independent and specialized bodies to assess the quality of 
regulatory outputs and whether the IRAs accomplish the market-related objectives for which they 
are created to achieve. Such bodies exist elseweher and have proven to be crucial in the proper 
functioning of IRAs in the USA and the UK, two countries whose IRA systems serve as examples 
to others, and provide support and legitimacy for their independent status. 
Concluding Remarks 
This study has revealed that there is no standard and consistent regulatory design employed 
for all economic sector IRAs in Turkey. The variations observed in the independence and 
accountability features of these agencies emerges as a question that requires further scrunity. One 
hypothesis may be that regulatory designs reflect, to a large extent, the differences in the times as 
well as the domestic/international political/economic environment in which the IRAs have been 
created. Sosay and Zenginobuz (2005) present an analysis focusing mainly on the international 
factors/actors that have led to the diffusion of IRAs in Turkey. Studies that concentrate more on the 
domestic political and economic dynamics behind the proliferation of IRAs in Turkey can 
complement their effort. 
Ther objective of this paper has been to explore the interaction between the formal 
(statutory) independence and accountability of economic sector IRAs in Turkey. As such it has been 
a part of a more comprehensive research agenda that also involves measuring the informal   33
independence of IRAs in Turkey, developing indices of formal and informal accountability, and 
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Table 1: Formal (statutory) independence of regulatory agencies: operationalization (Gilardi 
2002) 
 
Variable Indicators  Numerical 
coding 
A) Agency Head Status  1) Term of Office   
  -over 8 years  1.00 
  -6 to 8 years  0.80 
  -5 years  0.60 
  -4 years  0.40 
  -fixed term under 4 at the discretion of the appointer  0.20 
  -no fixed term  0.00 
  2) Who appoints the agency head?   
  -the board members  1.00 
  -a mix of the executive and the legislative  0.75 
  -the legislature  0.50 
  -the executive collectively  0.25 
  -one or two ministers  0.00 
  3) Dismissal   
  -dismissal is impossible  1.00 
  -only for reasons not related to policy  0.67 
  -no specific provisions for dismissal  0.33 
  -at the appointer’s discretion  0.00 
  4) May the agency head hold other offices in government?   
  -no  1.00 
  -only with permission of the executive  0.50 
  -no specific provision  0.00 
  5) Is the appointment renewable?   
  -no  1.00 
  -yes, once  0.50 
  -yes, more than once  0.00 
  6) Is independence a formal requirement for the appointment?   
  -yes  1.00 
  -no  0.00 
B) Board members status  7) Term of Office   
  -over 8 years  1.00 
  -6 to 8 years  0.80 
  -5 years  0.60 
  -4 years  0.40 
  -fixed term under 4 at the discretion of the appointer  0.20 
  -no fixed term  0.00 
  8) Who appoints the board members? 
-the board members 
 
  -the agency head  1.00 
  -a mix of the executive and the legislative  0.75 
  -the legislature  0.50 
  -the executive collectively  0.25 
  -one or two ministers  0.00 
  9) Dismissal   
  -dismissal is impossible  1.00 
  -only for reasons not related to policy  0.67 
  -no specific provisions for dismissal  0.33   36
  -at the appointer’s discretion  0.00 
  10) May the board members hold other offices in 
government? 
 
  -no  1.00 
  -only with permission of the executive  0.50 
  -no specific provision  0.00 
  11) Is the appointment renewable?   
  -no  1.00 
  -yes, once  0.50 
  -yes, more than once  0.00 
  12) Is independence a formal requirement for the 
appointment? 
 
  -yes  1.00 
  -no  0.00 
C) Relationship with government 
and parliament 
13) Is the independence of the agency formally stated?   
  -yes  1.00 
  -no  0.00 
  14) Which are the formal obligations of the agency vis-à-vis 
the government? 
 
  -none  1.00 
  -presentation of annual report for information only  0.67 
  -presentation of an annual report that must be approved  0.33 
  -the agency is fully accountable  0.00 
  15) Which are the formal obligations of the agency vis-à-vis 
the parliament? 
 
  -none  1.00 
  -presentation of annual report for information only  0.67 
  -presentation of an annual report that must be approved  0.33 
  -the agency is fully accountable  0.00 
  16) Who, other than a court, can overturn the agency’s 
decision where it has exclusive competency? 
 
  -none  1.00 
  -a specialized body  0.67 
  -the government, with qualifications  0.33 
  -the government, unconditionally  0.00 
D) Financial and organizational 
autonomy 
17) Which is the source of the agency’s budget?   
  -external funding  1.00 
  -government and regulated firms  0.50 
  -government  0.00 
  18) How is the budget controlled?   
  -by the agency  1.00 
  -by both the government and the agency  0.50 
  -the government 
19) Who decides on the agency’s internal organization? 
0.00 
  -the agency  1.00 
  -the parliament  0.50 
  -the government  0.00 
  20) Who is in charge of the agency’s personnel policy?   
  -the agency  1.00 
  -the government  0.00 
   37
Table 2: Independent Regulatory Agencies in Turkey 
 
  Law/ Date of 
Creation 
Sectors  Composition and Appointment of the 
Board 
Source of Income 
 
Banking Regulation and 
Supervision Agency (BRSA) 
Law 4389 / 1999 
(became effective in 
2000) 
Banking -7  members 
-6 year term (renewable) 
 
Nominations by:  
-Minister in charge of BRSA 
 
-Special Fund: up to three per ten thousand of the total assets 
of banks (as reported in their balance sheets) 
 
Capital Markets Board (CMB) 
Law 2499 / 1981 





-6 year term (renewable) 
 
Nominations by: 
-“Related” Minister (2) 
-Ministry of Finance (1) 
-Minister of Industry and Trade (1) 
-BRSA (1) 
-TOBB (1) 
-Union of Turkish Capital Market 
Intermediary Institutions (1) 
-Special Fund: three per thousand of the isssuance value of 
capital instruments 
 
-General Budget (if necessary) 
Source: Zenginobuz (2002b)  38
Table 2: Independent Regulatory Agencies in Turkey (cont.d) 
 
  Law/ Date 
of Creation 
Sectors Composition  and 
Appointment of the Board 
Source of Income 
Telecommunications 
Authority (TA) 
Law 4502 / 
2000 
Telecommunication -5  members 
-5 year term (renewable) 
 
Nominations by: 
-Minister of Transportation (3) 
-Minister of Industry and 
Trade, and TOBB (Union of 
Turkish Chambers and 
Exchanges) (1) 
-Telecommunication Sector (1) 
 
-Frequency license and usage fees 
-One per ten thousand of license fees 
-Contributions from operators 
-Income from publications and consulting 










-6 year term (renewable) 
 
-Appointed directly by the 
Council of Minister 
-License fees 
-One percent of transmissison fees  
-Contributions from up to one per thousand of 
annual revenues of operators in the natural gas 
sector 
Source: Zenginobuz (2002b)  39
Table 2: Independent Regulatory Agencies in Turkey (cont.d) 
 
 Law/  Date  of 
Creation 
Sectors  Composition and Appointment of 
the Board 
Source of Income 
Turkish Competition 
Agency (CA) 
Law 4054 / 1994 





-6 year term (renewable) 
 
Nominations by: 
-Competition Authority (4) 
-Minister of Industry and Trade (2) 
-Minister in charge of State Planning 
Institute (1) 
-Court of Appeals (1) 
-Council of State (1) 
-Interuniversity Council (1) 
-TOBB (Union of Turkish Chambers 
and Exchanges) (1) 
-Two per thousand of registered capitals of corporations 
-Five percent of fines assessed by RK 
-Income from publications 
Source: Zenginobuz (2002b)  40
Table 2: Independent Regulatory Agencies in Turkey (cont.d) 
 Law/  Date 
of Creation 
Sectors  Composition and Appointment of 
the Board 
Source of Income 





-5 year term (renewable) 
 
Nominations by: 
-Minister of Industry and Trade (1) 
-Minister of Agriculture (1) 
-Minister in charge of Undersecretariat 
of Foreign Trade (1) 
-Turkish Sugar Factories Inc. (1) 
-Union of Turkish Sugar Beet 
Producer Cooperatives (1) 
-Private Sugar Companies (2) 
-Five per thousand of revenues from domestic sales of 
companies 
Tobacco, Tobacco 










-5 year term (renewable) 
 
Nominations by: 
-Minister of Finance (1) 
-Minister of Health (1) 
-Minister of Agriculture (1) 
-Undersecretariat of Treasury (1) 
-Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade (1) 
-Union of Turkish Chambers of 
Agriculture (1) 
-Minister in charge of TEKEL Inc. (1) 
-Four per thousand of revenues from tobacco products and 
alcoholic beverages produced (import value if imported) 
-License fees 
Source: Zenginobuz (2002b)  41
Table 2: Independent Regulatory Agencies in Turkey (cont.d) 
 
  Law/ Date of 
Creation 
Sectors Composition  and 
Appointment of the 
Board 




Law 4734 / 
2002 
All public bodies  -10 members 










-Council of State (1) 
-Court of Accounts (1) 
-Union of Turkish 
Chambers and Exchanges 
(1) 
-Confederation of 
Turkish Employer Unions 
(1) 
-Five per ten thousand of value of procurement contracts (to be collected from 
contractors) 
-Fees for filing complaints 
-Income from publications 
--General Budget (if necessary) 
 
 
Source: Zenginobuz (2002b)Table 3: Details on statutory independence of two Turkish agencies: EMRA and TTAMRA 
 
    EMRA TTAMRA 
1) Term of Office  6 years  5 years 
2) Who appoints the 
agency head?  Council of Ministers  Council of Ministers 
3) Dismissal  only for incapacity or 
misbehavior 
only for incapacity or 
misbehavior 
4) May the agency head 
hold other offices in 
government? 
no  no specific provision 
5) Is the appointment 
renewable?  yes Yes 
A) Agency 
Head Status 
6) Is independence a 
formal requirement for 
the appointment? 
yes  no specific provision 
7) Term of Office  6 years  5 years 
8) Who appoints the 
board members?  Council of Ministers  Council of Ministers 
9) Dismissal  only for incapacity or 
misbehavior 
only for incapacity or 
misbehavior 
10) May the board 
members hold other 
offices in government? 
no  no specific provision 
11) Is the appointment 




12) Is independence a 
formal requirement for 
the appointment? 
yes  no specific provision 
13) Is the independence 
of the agency formally 
stated? 
yes yes 
14) Which are the 
formal obligations of 
the agency vis-à-vis the 
government? 
annual report for 
information  annual report for information 
15) Which are the 
formal obligations of 
the agency vis-à-vis the 
parliament? 
annual report for 







16) Who, other than a 
court, can overturn the 
agency’s decision 
where it has exclusive 
competency? 
none  government with 
qualifications 
17) Which is the source 
of the agency’s budget?  regulated firms  regulated firms 
18) How is the budget 
controlled?  by the agency  by both the agency and the 
government 
19) Who decides on the 
agency’s internal 
organization? 





20) Who is in charge of 
the agency’s personnel 
policy? 
the agency  the agency 
Independence Index  0,71  0,39 
Source: Zenginobuz (2002b)  43
 
Table 4: Formal (statutory) Independence of Regulatory Agencies in Turkey 
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Source: Zenginobuz (2002b);   *From Gilardi (2002).   44
 
 
Table 5: Accountability and Transparency Across Regulatory Regimes (Source: Lodge 2004) 
 









Locus of authority  Technocratic authority  Individual consumer  Participation in collective 
decision making 
Decision making 
process involved in the 




Competition between sets 





Transparency of the 











supervision by experts, 











transparency of controls 
on regulated activities 
Reporting duties and 
legalism 
Competition between 











Reviews by experts   Evolution of competitive 
































   45
Table 6: Accountability of IRAs in Turkey 
 
 




Formal obligations to 
the Parliament? 
Formal obligations to the 
government? 
CA  The chair of the board  Yes  Annual informing of the 
parliament’s Planning 
and Budget Committee 
(Law No 4743) 
Annual report to the 
Council of Ministers (Law 
No 4743) 
CMB  The chair of the board  Yes  Annual informing of the 
parliament’s Planning 
and Budget Committee 
(Law No 4743) 
Annual report to the 
Council of Ministers (Law 
No 4743); Semi-annual 
Annual report of its 
strategies and their 
implemetation ot the 
Council of Ministers; 
Annual report together with 
financial accounts to the 
related minister; 
Presentation of analyses 
when requested by the 
minister 
BRSA  The chair of the board  Yes  Annual informing of the 
parliament’s Planning 
and Budget Committee 
(Law No 4743); Annual 
report of activities, 
including an analysis of 
their social and 
economic effects, 
performance and 
financial accounts to the 
parliament 
Annual report to the 
Council of Ministers (Law 
No 4743); Annual report 
together with financial 
accounts to the related 
minister; Clearance of 
financial accounts by the 
Council of Ministers 
TA  The chair of the board  Yes  Annual informing of the 
parliament’s Planning 
and Budget Committee 
(Law No 4743) 
Annual report to the 
Council of Ministers (Law 
No 4743) 
EMRA  The chair of the board  Yes  Annual informing of the 
parliament’s Planning 
and Budget Committee 
(Law No 4743) 
Annual report to the 
Council of Ministers (Law 
No 4743); Annual report 
together with financial 
accounts to the related 
minister;  
PPA  The chair of the board  Yes  Annual informing of the 
parliament’s Planning 
and Budget Committee 
(Law No 4743) 
Annual report to the 
Council of Ministers (Law 
No 4743); Annual financial 
report to the Council of 
Ministers; Clearance of 
financial accounts by the 
Council of Ministers 
SA  The chair of the board  Yes  Annual informing of the 
parliament’s Planning 
and Budget Committee 
(Law No 4743) 
Annual report to the 
Council of Ministers (Law 
No 4743) 
TTAMRA  The chair of the board  Yes  Annual informing of the 
parliament’s Planning 
and Budget Committee 
(Law No 4743) 
Annual report of the 
Council of Ministers (Law 
No 4743) 
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Table 6: Accountability of IRAs in Turkey (cont.) 
 
  Formal obligations 
regarding disclosure 
of information to 

















CA  The Right to Obtain 
Information Law 
No No  Yes  Court  of 
Accounts 
CMB  The Right to Obtain 
Information Law; 
Weekly bulletin 
No No  Yes  The  ‘related’   
minister 





Announcement of its 
risk management 
policies to the public; 
Publicaiton of 
decisions in the 
Official Gazette 
No No  Yes  A  committee 
appointed by 
the Minister 
related with the 
BRSA and 
consisting of an 
inspector from 
the Court of 
Accounts, an 
inspector from 
the Ministry of 





TA  The Right to Obtain 
Information Law 
No No  Yes  Court  of 
Accounts 
EMRA  The Right to Obtain 
Information Law; the 
chair informing the 
public Informing the 
public on the details 
of grants from 
international 
institutions 









No No  Yes  Court  of 
Accounts 
SA  The Right to Obtain 
Information Law; 
The chair informing 
the public 





TTAMRA  The Right to Obtain 
Information Law 
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Table 6: Accountability of IRAs in Turkey (cont.) 
 
 Through  whom 
can the decisions 





other than a 
court, can 
overturn the 
decisions of the 












grounds can the 
chair and/or 
board members 
of the IRA be 
dismissed?  
 
CA  The Council of 
State 
No body  Errors of law  Loss of 
qualifications for 
the job; violation 
of law  
CMB  Regional 
Administrative 
Court 
No body  Errors of law  Loss of 
qualifications for 
the job; violation 
of law 
BRSA  Regional 
Administrative 
Court 
No body  Errors of law   Loss of 
qualifications for 
the job; violation 
of law  
TA  Regional 
Administrative 
Court 
No body  Errors of law   Loss of 
qualifications for 
the job; violation 
of law 
EMRA  The Council of 
State 
No body  Errors of law   Loss of 
qualifications for 
the job; violation 
of law 
PPA  Regional 
Administrative 
Court 
No body  Errors of law   Loss of 
qualifications for 
the job; violation 
of law 
SA  Regional 
Administrative 
Court 
No body  Errors of law   Loss of 
qualifications for 
the job; violation 
of law 
TTAMRA  Not specified  Government with 
qualifications 
 Loss  of 
qualifications for 
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  Decision making process 
- specifications? 
Contents and format of decisions 
specified? 
CA  Decisions by absolute 
majority 
Yes 
CMB  Decisions by absolute 
majority 
No 
BRSA  Closed board  meetings; 
Decisions by absolute 
majority 
No 
TA  Decisions by absolute 
majority 
No 
EMRA  Decisions by absolute 
majority 
No 
PPA  Decisions by absolute 
majority 
No 
SA  Decisions by absolute 
majority 
No 
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